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Further, it represents the policy choice taken by the Florida Supreme
Court on this issue. Whether the law and the policy on which the
decision rests are the best suited for Florida's needs is a far more
uncertain question.
WILLIAM

D.

GODDARD

EASEMENTS BY NECESSITY: WATER ACCESS NO
LONGER A BAR
Redman v. Kidwell, 180 So. 2d 682 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965)
The petitioner and the respondent purchased land from a common
grantor. The petitioner's land was inaccessible to public roads except
over the respondent's land or a navigable river. The petitioner
sought a way of necessity over the respondent's land, but failed in
the trial court. On appeal, HELD, the petitioner should be given a
means of ingress and egress over the respondent's land. The Second
District Court of Appeal found that section 704.01 (1) of the Florida
Statutes has adopted "a reasonable and practical" common law way
by necessity, and access to land by a navigable river is no longer
"reasonable and practical."
Two easements by necessity have been created in Florida by statute.
Section 704.01 (1) is a codification of the common law way by necessity. Section 704.01 (2) provides relief to landlocked estates, in limited
situations, when no common law way by necessity can be granted; it
requires (1) that the dominant estate compensate the servient estate
and (2) the dominant estate must be located "outside any municipality [and be used] or desired to be used as a dwelling or for agricultural or for timber raising or cutting or [for] stock raising purposes." The court in the principal case did not state which type of
easement it granted. It is reasonable to assume that the common law
way by necessity was granted because if the court had provided relief
under section 704.01 (2), the case would have required a remand to
the trial court to determine the value of the easement under a proceeding outlined in the statute.
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The test of necessity required by sections 704.01 (1) and 704.01 (2)
is the same. The language describing the degree of necessity in both
statutes is "reasonable and practical." Section 704.03 of the Florida
Statutes defines the words "reasonable and practical," as used in
sections 704.01 (1) and 704.01 (2), as without the use of "bridge, ferry,
turnpike road, embankment or substantial fill."
Common law easements by necessity have their roots in English
common law at least as early as 1379.1 The development of ways by
necessity from 1379 to 1606 is difficult to follow. In Clarke v. Cogge,
there is a clear statement that a way by necessity should be granted
2
if "he [the landlocked owner] could not have any profits of his land."The Clarke court speaks in terms of results: it announced when an
easement by necessity will be granted, but not why. Packer v. Welstead provides the answer: "But it is also to the prejudice of the public
weal, that land should lie fresh and unoccupied."' The English
economy was and still is closely tied to land. A way by necessity
there, then, is a public policy developed to insure that no land will
be taken out of the economic system merely because there is no means
of egress and ingress to a given estate.
Certain limits have been placed upon this general public policy
of a way by necessity as it is found in this country. The limits arose
primarily because the common law way by necessity was given without
compensation to the servient estate. The fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution provides that no man should be required to
give up his land without just compensation. Yet the public policy of
keeping land useful in our economy is a strong one. The courts generally solved this conflict in terms of the intent of the parties at the
4
time of the severance of the estate into dominant and servient tenants.
The courts of the nineteenth century became so fascinated with
the intent of the parties that the basic public policy was sometimes
completely hidden in their opinions:5

1. Fitzherbert, Grants 41, cited in Simonton, Ways by Necessity, 25 COLUM.
L. REv. 571, 572 n.5 (1925).
2. Cro. Jac. 170 (K.B. 1607).
3. 2 Sid. 39 (K.B. 1658).
4. Jann v. Standard Cement Co., 54 Ind. App. 221, 102 N.E. 872 (1913);
Doten v. Bartlett, 107 Me. 351, 78 At. 456 (1910); Bauman v. Wagner, 146 App.
Div. 191, 130 N.Y. Supp. 1016 (4th Dep't 1911). If it was found that the parties
intended use of the grantor's lands as access to the grantee's estate, a way by
necessity was allowed; if the intent was otherwise, no way was allowed. Perhaps
this was another way of saying that the court was not depriving the grantor of a
valuable property right without compensation because the grantor had received
consideration for the easement in the purchase price.
5. Collins v. Prentice, 15 Conn. 39, 44 (1842).
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And although it is called a way of necessity, yet in strictness,
the necessity does not create the way, but merely furnishes evidence as to the real intention of the parties. For the law will
not presume, that it was the intention of the parties that one
should convey land to the other, in such a manner that the
grantee could derive no benefit from the conveyance.... The
law, under such circumstances, will give effect to the grant according to the presumed intent of the parties.
This statement of total reliance on the intent of the parties becomes
almost ludicrous when read in conjunction with the facts of the case.
The litigants purchased their estates at the same auction. Exactly
what purchasers at auctions intend can only be arrived at by judicial
fictions. The strength of the public policy, in this opinion, is clearly
evident. The court did not want to deprive a man of his property
without compensation, but neither did it wish other lands to lie
fallow in order to preserve his rights. Therefore, it deprived a man

of a valuable property right, based upon the fiction of his intent, so
that other lands could be useful in the economy. 6
Modern decisions have placed more importance upon the degree
of necessity that will support the granting of an easement by necessity
than the intent of the parties.7 In terms of the policy behind ways by
necessity, the question now is: How productive in our economy will
land be if the easement is not granted? The court should also consider whether or not the use to which the land could be put, if the
way by necessity were granted, is of great enough importance to our
economy to deprive the servient estate owner of a valuable property
right without compensation.
The principal case is the first Florida case to squarely face the
question whether access to land by water should obviate a way by
necessity. The first case that involved this problem in modern terms
6. Yet even the fiction of intent cannot help a grantee of an estate surrounded
by lands with which the estate has no common grantor. In this situation, there
is nothing to which intent, fictitious or otherwise, may attach. No court has felt
it could allow an easement in this situation. It has been suggested that if a
court could find some way to compensate the servient estate holder, it might well
grant the way, but to do so without some legislation goes too far for a court. Joyner
v. Andrews, 137 So. 2d 870 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962); TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §543

(abr. ed. 1940); Simonton, Ways by Necessity, 25 COLUM. L. REv. 571 (1925).
7. Walkup v. Becker, 161 So. 2d 893 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1964); Glass v. Barnett,
70 N.E.2d 105 (Ct. App. Ohio 1946); Tucker v. Nuding, 92 Ore. 319, 180 Pac. 903
(1919). Although the case dealt with powers of appointment over land, note this
modem expression of dissatisfaction with constructive intent: "I shall not indulge
in any elaborate discussion of the rules of construction in an attempt to discover
the assumed intent of the testatrix. . . . Rather, I believe the result must be
arrived at by deciding whether it [the result] is a desirable policy.
Equitable
Trust Co. v. James, 29 Del. Ch. 166, 47 A.2d 303 (Ct. Ch. 1946).
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was Feofees of GrammarSchool in Ipswich v. Proprietorsof Jeffery's
Neck Pasture.S There the court found the land in question was accessible to people and their needs by a river and steamboat, but not
to livestock. The court held that a way of necessity should be granted
so that livestock could be moved to and from the pasture by land.
The basic public policy can easily be seen operating in Ipswich. Raising livestock is not practical on land accessible only by water, and
raising livestock is of great enough public importance to subvert the
rights of a bordering landowner.
The courts of other jurisdictions have reached varying results by
similar policy reasoning. A cottage always in the past reached by
water could not maintain an easement by necessity; 9 a parcel of land
purchased to develop a steamer resort failed to create a way by necessity;10 subdivisions bordering tributaries to the Great Lakes were
given easements by necessity." In each of the above opinions, the
courts recognized that in the proper case, access by water to the
12
dominate estate would not obviate an easement by necessity.
In the principal case, the court recognized the modem trend, beginning in Ipswich, that access to land by water will not necessarily
bar a way by necessity. The court reasoned that the public policy
behind ways of necessity must be related to the times in which it
operates. The court felt society no longer considered that land
accessible only by water lacked -the degree of necessity required to
maintain an easement by necessity.
No case has been found before the principal case, however, in
which a court had before it two methods of granting a way by necessity. In its opinion, the court ignored the intended use of the
dominant estate. In his brief, the respondent admitted that the petitioner intended to use the land for dwelling purposes outside any
municipality. 3 Such a use is within the contemplation of section
704.01 (2). Therefore, given the requisite degree of necessity, the
court could have awarded a common law easement or an easement
under section 704.01 (2).
8. 174 Mass. 572, 55 N.E. 462 (1899).
9. Elliot v. Ferguson, 177 A.2d 387 (N.H. 1962).
10. Bauman v. Wagner, 146 App. Div. 191, 130 N.Y. Supp. 1016 (4th Dep't

1911).
11. Cookston v. Box, 160 N.E.2d 327 (Ohio 1959).
12. The utility of the dominate estate in these opinions was seriously impaired
because the only access to the estate was over water. In terms of the policy behind
ways of necessity, the decisions turned equally upon the impairment of the dominate estate and a net benefit to society, in excess of the loss suffered by the
servient estate, should the way be granted.
13. Brief for Appellee, (app. p. 2), Redman v. Kidwell, 180 So. 2d 682 (2d.
D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
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The qualification of the public policy behind easements by necessity is that no man should be deprived of his property without just
compensation. The respondent received his estate from the common
grantor twenty-three years before the petitioner. 14 Under these circumstances, the intent of the parties could only be arrived at by
judicial fictions. In Florida, the public policy of ways of necessity can
be satisfied without the use of fictions. The court should have required a showing that the intent of the litigating parties and their
common grantor in fact reflected that the servient estate was purchased subject to the easement. If not, relief should have been
granted under section 704.01 (2). Florida courts now have at their
disposal the power to give relief to landlocked estates and to compensate servient estates in proper cases. They should use it.15
GEORGE W.

JOHNSON

14. Brief for Appellee, supra note 13, at 9.
15. Caveat: The hypothesis of this comment depends upon a declaration by
the Florida Supreme Court that the proceeding in FLA. STAT. §704.01 (2) (1965),
to determine the value of an easement granted under this statute, is constitutional.
The nature of the proceeding is that of an eminent domain proceeding. There is
a very serious constitutional question whether a private individual should be
allowed to exercise such power; however, such a question is beyond the scope of
this comment.
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